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Evgeny Vinokurov, Peter Balas, Michael Emerson, Peter Havlik, 
Vladimir Pereboyev, Elena Rovenskaya, Anastasia Stepanova, Jurij Kofner, Pavel Kabat 
Executive Summary 
To become a realistic proposition, the idea of enhancing economic 
interaction between the EU and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 
would depend on major improvements in the geo-political context 
between the EU and Russia. 
Despite associated uncertainties, the policy and research 
community is challenged to anticipate and analyze prospects, 
opportunities and challenges related to the development of 
economic partnerships. Fundamentally, our point of departure is that all sides involved would benefit 
from the realization of the “Lisbon-to-Vladivostok” cooperation concept. 
In this context, within this research initiative, IIASA and its partner institutions take a long view 
regarding the EU-EAEU cooperation. It has been of particular importance to bring together officials 
and experts from both the EU and EAEU to participate in a constructive dialogue, seeking to prepare 
a mutually agreed foundation for future initiatives, which, as soon as the political context improves 
sufficiently, would support transition to the implementation of the Lisbon-to-Vladivostok concept. In 
particular, this would be based on the science-based evidence concerning the rebuilding of damaged 
economic relations between the EU and Russia. Setting aside the present serious political tensions, 
we intend to look forward, working with a hypothesis to expect better times when all conflicting 
parties work together towards a new set of cooperative approaches, including trade liberalization 
and setting up integration processes across the wider Eurasian continent. We believe that this brighter 
stage of relations should be diligently prepared for in advance. 
Arguably, given the necessary conditions, an agreement on deeper economic cooperation cum 
integration between the EU and the EAEU could become a reality within the next decade, by the 
mid-2020s. However, this would require the resolution of the present political disputes and 
economic/trade problems between the EU and Russia. Within the next decade, the task for the 
research community and policymakers should be to prepare the ground to substantiate the 
negotiations. IIASA aims to explore and design plausible future modalities in order to provide holistic 
assessment in the next several years. 
A prospective EU-EAEU cooperation agreement should be comprehensive in nature, given the scope, 
structure and the intertwining character of the relations between the EU, Russia, and countries of their 
joint broad neighborhood. Such an agreement might incorporate a large number of different dimensions, 
ranging from trade in goods and services to the free movement of capital and people, including the 
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facilitation of issuing visas and residence permits, as well as the development of trans-border and transit 
infrastructures, institutional relations and structures, regulations of intellectual property rights, 
government procurement, policies on state-owned companies and other cross-cutting regulatory issues. 
Due to the sheer scope of related issues, the discussion on an anticipated agreement, or set of 
agreements, could be referred to as a “mega deal”. As the importance of various aspects is likely to 
be different for the two sides, the mutual concessions and compromises would be necessarily 
interconnected. In particular, due to its current prevailing export structure, the EAEU might be 
interested not merely in a free trade agreement per se, but in a comprehensive agreement with the 
EU, going beyond a pure free trade agreement. It is probable that such a deep cooperation cannot be 
established in one step, rather it would be built gradually, in several stages. 
In this report, we summarize the deliberations of the initial “screening” discussions and preliminary 
policy ideas stemming from the series of IIASA workshops held during 2014–2016. We cover the 
following domains: 
• Methodology of assessing the economic impact of an EU-EAEU integration agreement on its parties: 
We stress that it should necessarily go beyond estimating short-term direct trade effects extending to 
long-term and indirect effects, especially those related to the non-tariff barriers; proper estimation of 
the impacts of these will require a combination of contemporary analytical and modeling methods. 
• Trade regimes: We provide a list of 20 potential domains of the EU-EAEU “mega-deal”—from 
trade in goods to intellectual property; and make an argument, that in order to become mutually 
beneficial for all sides, this deal should go beyond a pure, traditional free trade area. 
• Non-tariff barriers: We emphasize that the economic impacts of non-tariff barriers (technical 
standards, health and veterinary regulations, customs administration, etc.) can be very substantial, 
far exceeding the impacts of eliminating the remaining import tariffs. 
• Energy: We suggest that there is a fundamental reciprocal interest in energy security for the EU 
and Russia. For the EU, this is supply security (source security, transit security, and fair and 
predictable prices); for Russia and Kazakhstan, this is demand security (financial and economic 
security, and fair and predictable prices); for transit countries—stability of revenues and supplies; 
for all, it is about environmental security and systemic resilience. 
• Transport and infrastructure: We focus on the need to modernize and further develop the major 
Eurasian transport corridors (both road and railway) until 2030. As concerns infrastructure, we 
also stress the huge potentials of the development of common electric power markets, pipeline 
systems and trans-continental fiber-optic links. Adequate regulatory frameworks, security, and 
investments are key in both domains. 
• Mobility of people: We argue for the facilitation of issuing visas and residence permits in order to 
ensure the mobility of business people, experts, and professionals, and the mutual recognition of 
qualifications. These steps can eventually lead to visa-free regime, large-scale academic exchanges, 
and the technical decision for the mobility of trans-border pensions. At the same time, we argue 
against prematurely raising the issue of the labour migration in the EU-EAEU context. 
Another topic concerns the future of trade and economic relations between the EU, the EAEU and Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia, the three states that have already concluded AA deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreements with the EU. The development of EU-EAEU relations will require the opening of constructive 
negotiations on a fair trade policy between the three DCFTA signatory states and the EAEU, with the 
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participation of the EU to ensure the compatibility of the EU-EAEU cooperation deals with the respective 
DCFTAs. 
The IIASA 2014–2016 Project Takes a Long View 
of  Cooperation in Eurasia 
Global economic policies during the last few decades have been evolving towards regionalization. 
Not only has the number of regional integration arrangements increased but, even more strikingly, their 
scope and depth have expanded remarkably. The systemic development of the EU internally, coupled 
with its gradual enlargement by countries from Central and Eastern Europe, has been one of the most 
ambitious integration processes so far. The subsequent establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2010, and its evolution into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with five 
member states in 2015, represent a major example of regional economic integration in northern Eurasia. 
The potential interaction between the two integration processes on the Eurasian continent creates 
a number of opportunities for faster economic development in the countries involved; yet it also poses 
several challenges of ensuring mutual compatibility and fairness in sharing the associated costs and 
benefits. 
To become a realistic proposition, the idea of a constructive interaction between the EU and EAEU would 
depend on major improvements in the geo-political context between the EU and Russia. This is currently 
at a low point, as symbolized by the ongoing mutual sanctions. Yet it should not be forgotten that earlier 
in the post-Soviet period there were positive developments in the EU-Russian relations, including the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiated in the 1990s, the four common spaces of the 
early 2000s, and the attempts (currently suspended) to shape the “New Agreement” intended to succeed 
the PCA. Moreover, the EU used to view the Lisbon-to-Vladivostok idea positively, at least in principle, and, 
more recently, the cooperation between the EU and EAEU. 
A turning point for the better would require the re-building of trust between the EU and Russia, based 
on an understanding about the strategic position of Ukraine between the EU on the one hand, and 
Russia on the other. In the economic area, the present regime of mutual sanctions and distrust should 
be stopped and reversed. There were some attempts in this respect to find pragmatic solutions to the 
most pressing issues, as demonstrated by the trilateral diplomacy between the EU, Russia and Ukraine 
on two crucial topics, gas supplies to, and transit through Ukraine, and the work of ministers in charge 
of trade on dealing with the possible impacts of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA on Russian economic interests. 
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However, the latter process ended with failure, leading to the suspension of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States relations between Russia and Ukraine. 
A fundamental change in the present stand-off is not possible without a resolution of the core political 
differences, but these efforts could be underpinned and facilitated by elaborating concepts and 
possible practical ways for the development of the economic relationship between the EU and EAEU. 
In this context, the ongoing work at IIASA has been of particular importance, by bringing together 
officials and think tank experts from both the EU and EAEU, by seeking to prepare the ground for more 
constructive initiatives and, as soon as the political context improves sufficiently, to launch initiatives 
concerning the Lisbon-to-Vladivostok cooperation idea. This would be based on the science-based 
evidence concerning a rebuilding of the damaged economic relations between the EU and Russia. 
 
In this spirit, the international and interdisciplinary research initiative “Challenges and opportunities 
of economic integration across a wider European and Eurasian space”, ongoing during 2014–2016 and 
coordinated by IIASA (Laxenburg, Austria), aims to discuss, analyze and critically evaluate issues 
related to the economic cooperation between the EU, the EAEU, and their neighbors. The work has 
also a broader vision, extending, wherever relevant, to the key Asian players, such as China, India, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea.1 
                                                          
1See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/eurasian/EconomicIntegration.html. 
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The current three-year research initiative consists of a series of scoping workshops at which specific 
aspects of integration are being discussed by scientists and stakeholders representing all interested 
regions. The deliberations in the IIASA workshops have already laid the foundations for the 
forthcoming research phase of the project. The six workshops held at IIASA dealt with methodological 
issues, trade policy regimes, non-tariff barriers, oil and gas, electricity, and transport infrastructure, 
labor markets and migration. 
The work on technical and applied issues is embedded in a broader conceptual framework that often 
comes under the “Inter-regionalism” or “Regionalism 2.0” headings. The basic question here is how 
trade blocs (and very large single economies, like the USA and China) can structure their economic 
relations with each other. The global attempts to further liberalize world trade have basically stalled. 
The WTO’s Doha Round launched in 2001 has so far largely failed to achieve any major breakthroughs. 
At the same time, most countries have strong interests in advancing their trade linkages or, more 
ambitiously, economic integration—at least with their preferred trade partners. The result has been 
a proliferation of preferential trade agreements on a huge scale. Global trade structures are being 
transformed without any emerging global order. 
For trade liberalization and integration several modalities and concepts exist. The first model is that 
of bilateral free trade between just two economies which can be a relatively simpler affair. 
The majority of the existing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) only cover trade in goods, a lower, but still 
considerable number cover trade in both goods and services, while a small number aims at more 
ambitious goals such as the liberalization of the movement of all four factors of production, including 
that of capital and people. There are even fewer examples of creating customs unions. 
The second model consists of the formation of regional integration blocs, of which the EU is the most 
prominent example. In South America the Mercosur group has attempted to achieve something 
similar through a customs union; however, it is subject to multiple exemptions and has failed to 
advance. Another promising attempt is the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations group 
in South-East Asia, which, however, is not a customs union. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement among Canada, Mexico, and the USA represents another integration initiative, but it is 
Box 1. Schedule and Focus of IIASA “Eurasia” Workshops, 2014–2016 
Workshop 1 
Methodology for Accessing Effects of Regional Economic Integration, 6–7 March 2014 
Workshop 2 
Trade Policy Regimes, 8–9 July 2014 
Workshop 3 
Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Regulation, 20–21 November 2014 
Workshop 4 
Futures of Energy in Eurasia in the Global Context, 12–13 May 2015 
Workshop 5 
Development of Transport and Infrastructure in Eurasia, 15–16 September 2015 
Workshop 6 
Labor markets and Migration, 13–14 April 2016 
Workshop 7 
EU-EAEU in Greater Eurasia: Long-Term Agenda for Economic Cooperation (Finalizing the Project), 22–24 
November 2016 
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relatively modest in the degree of integration, and again it is not a customs union. The most recent 
example is the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia established in 2010. On January 1, 
2012 the three states formed a Single Economic Space to promote further economic integration.2 It 
was turned into the EAEU on January 1, 2015 and enlarged by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU aims 
at a higher degree of economic integration modeled in some respects on the EU experience. 
The third model is that of inter-regional integration agreements which can have several versions. The most 
large=scale ones are the inter-continental initiatives, of which two are currently in progress. The first is the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which brings together much of East and South-East Asia and the Western 
coast of the Pacific, albeit with the major exclusion of China. The second is the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the EU and the USA. The TTIP—which 
recently faces increasing controversies on both sides of the Atlantic—aims at deeper regulatory 
convergence, thus going far beyond the simple free trade. Another variety of inter-regionalism is a 
bloc-to-bloc one, which in principle entails the most complex negotiating processes. So far there are hardly 
any precedents for this. The EU is trying to negotiate with the Mercado Común del Sur, but has discovered 
the problem of its partner’s weak internal cohesion. Still, this variety of inter-regionalism is likely to play an 
increasingly important role, making the global trade and investment system ever more multi-layered and 
complex. Any potential EU-EAEU deal would fall into this category. Irrespective of the present serious 
political tensions, the prospective IIASA project intends to look forward, working with the hypothesis to 
expect better times when all conflicting parties will work together towards a new, cooperative approaches, 
including trade liberalization and setting up integration structures on the wider Eurasian continent. 
Anticipating a brighter stage of relations, options for the future EU-EAEU cooperation should be thoroughly 
analyzed in advance. 
The Project’s Workshops and Selected Findings 
The main goal of this section is to sum up the 
discussions and preliminary findings of the 
current IIASA project on economic cooperation 
challenges in Eurasia. We will do it in seven parts 
below, starting with methodology and moving to 
trade, energy and infrastructure, and the 
mobility of persons. 
In addition to representatives of the EU, the EAEU, the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and IIASA, 
the workshops attracted high-level participants from the private sector, the World Bank and other 
development banks, embassies, and research institutions and think tanks from Austria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, Japan, United States and Ukraine. 
                                                          
2Stepanova (2013). 
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Assessing the Economic Impact of Regional Integration Agreements3 
This workshop dealt with a multiplicity of models and estimates used to evaluate macroeconomic 
consequences of inter-country and inter-regional trade policies. The key modeling approaches 
presented and discussed were: 
• Statistics-based indexes, 
• Gravity models, and 
• Computable general and partial equilibrium models (CGE and CPGE), etc. 
The discussion at the workshop concluded that when assessing the effects of (hypothetical) 
agreements, it is worthwhile to combine various quantitative analytical methods. General equilibrium 
models play a particularly important role in the “universe” of applied methods, but should be 
complemented by various econometric and statistics-based approaches. 4  This enables the 
researchers to examine the diverse consequences of economic integration and obtain more reliable 
estimates. It is advisable to use simpler, but still informative analytical methods, particularly in the 
early stages. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive assessment of economic impact should necessarily go beyond trade 
effects by explicitly including the impacts of potential measures that concern, for example, the 
development of transport infrastructure, common electricity markets, the movement of capital and 
people, and visa liberalization regimes. 
In general, methodologically this research project is carried out in three stages, where the first stage 
is designed to identify the trade barriers, the second one—based on the results of the first—is the 
modeling stage, and the third stage is focused on the development of policy recommendations (also 
in the form of options) for conducting—in some cases asymmetric—negotiations. 
The selection of each method is determined by the tasks being addressed at each specific stage 
of the study, as well as by the availability of data. Qualitative assessment of the policies and their 
implementation should also be used during the study, because often there is a large gap between 
the officially announced formal measures and their implementation in practice. When used 
separately, none of the available analytical tools allows a comprehensive assessment of the 
impact of a deeper EU-EAEU economic integration. A combination of different methods should 
therefore be used, based on their strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and limitations 
(see materials of the 1st IIASA Workshop). 
Framing the Prospective Negotiations: Domains and StructureWill the idea of an economic integration 
agreement between the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) ever come to 
fruition? At this point, even raising the question seems to be a non-starter. Relations between the EU 
and Russia—the country that accounts for the bulk of EAEU economy (see Appendix Figure 1)—are in 
a deep crisis. Economic cooperation is hampered by the current mutual sanctions. In fully 
understanding the gravity of the situation, we are reminded of the origins of the EU soon after the 
                                                          
3 IIASA Workshop report on EU-EAEU Potential Economic Integration: Methodological Approaches to the 
Assessment of Economic Impact. 
4See Pelipas, Tochitskaya, Vinokurov (2014). This report reviews the methodology of quantifying economic 
integration impacts, including the potential EU-EAEU rapprochement has been prepared for the first IIASA 
workshop and has been published under two logos, EDB and IIASA. 
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end of World War II. It was at that time that the foundations of European integration were first laid. 
In general, the foundations of the new have frequently been laid in times of crisis. Who would have 
thought, back in 1945, that in just ten short years, tangible European integration would begin? 
A prospective EU-EAEU cooperation agreement should be comprehensive in nature, given the scope, 
structure and the intertwining character of the EU’s relations with Russia and other Eurasian countries. Such 
an agreement might incorporate a large number of different domains, ranging from trade in goods and 
services to the free movement of capital, labor and visa-free regime, development of trans-border and 
transit infrastructure, institutional convergence, regulations of intellectual property rights and other 
regulatory issues. 
Due to the sheer scope of the related issues, the discussion of an anticipated agreement—or a set of 
agreements—could be framed in terms of a “mega deal”. The mutual concessions and compromises 
would be necessarily interconnected. The importance of various domains will be different for both 
parties. Having weaknesses in one area, the given partner will expect a “trade-off” with respect to 
another problem. The EU-EAEU mega deal assumes exactly this approach to an inter-regional integration 
agreement that would bring together the two competing blocs. It is a new idea, which means that it is 
particularly challenging and complicated. What might be the main characteristics of this prospective 
agreement? 
First, the party to the deal, irrespective of the legal form it might take, would be not be Russia but the 
Eurasian Economic Union, by virtue of its supranational authority. National representatives (the 
relevant departments of economic ministries, foreign affairs ministries, etc.), would certainly be 
present and, at the decisive stages in order to set the course of the negotiations and the substantive 
points of the final agreements—also high-level political leaders and parliaments. However, the 
negotiations would formally be led by the European Commission and the Eurasian Economic 
Commission. This is an important nuance—just as new and unfamiliar to the participants of the 
Eurasian integration process as it would be to the EU, despite the extensive experience of the latter 
in conducting trade negotiations. 
Second, the EAEU member states would be interested not merely in a free trade agreement per se but in 
a comprehensive agreement going beyond a pure, traditional FTA. The motivation is quite simple: a 
“bare-bones” free-trade zone is not sufficiently advantageous to either Russia or Kazakhstan, which 
dominate the EAEU’s economy and their exports consist primarily of energy and raw materials. Due to 
their current trade structures, Russia and Kazakhstan would have little interest in a narrowly defined free-
trade regime with the EU (this, to a lesser extent, holds true for Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan as well). 
This being said, the obvious problems in the realm of trade concessions would have to be offset by gains 
in other regulatory areas. The main challenge is that a significant progress is needed in other areas of 
EU-EAEU economic relations do that the idea of cooperation becomes truly viable. 
Third, there are various models for such an agreement between the EU and the EAEU, which would 
encompass a broad swath of relevant issues—from a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
(DCFTA) to a comprehensive economic and trade agreement. Like the one negotiated between Canada 
and the EU (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement). The latter, concluded in 2013 
(although not signed and ratified as yet), could be, in terms of the legal structure, reasonably viewed as 
one of the possible instructive prototypes for the EU-EAEU mega-deal. A DCFTA is less suitable because 
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of the centrality of convergence to EU laws and regulations which in some areas would not be plausible 
for the EAEU. 
Fourth, it should be noted that full-fledged negotiations between the EU and the EAEU will be 
impossible without the WTO membership of all member states of the Eurasian Economic Union. At 
this stage in 2016 Belarus is the only EAEU country that is not yet a member of the WTO. Russia lends 
its full support to Belarus in its Geneva negotiations. Given the right conditions in the Belorussian 
economy, the EU seems to be ready to take a favourable view of this process. 
Fifth, the scope of potential issues that could be addressed in the EU-EAEU context encompasses a 
large number of items. The following list contains many of these, but it is certainly not exhaustive. 
Nevertheless, it illustrates the complexity of the potential EU-EAEU agenda: 
• Trade in goods (abolishment of import duties with a clearly-defined set of exemptions). 
• Elimination/streamlining of non-tariff trade barriers. 
• Regulation of cross-border digital trade. 
• Trade in services. 
• Movement of people. 
• Liberalization of access to financial markets. 
• Free capital movement. 
• Regulatory convergence (norms and standards). 
• Intellectual property rules. 
• Development of international transport infrastructure (road and rail corridors). 
• Establishment of an EU-EAEU common electricity power market. 
• Regulation of access to the EU market under the Third Energy package. 
• Environmental agenda (as regards various trans-border issues and standards). 
• Regulation of partial reciprocal access to public procurements. 
• Competition rules. 
• Disciplines on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
• Rules for public procurement. 
• Dispute resolution mechanisms. 
In addition, there are a number of important issues which, however, are outside the EU and/or EAEU 
competences. These can be resolved on bilateral and multilateral level in various configurations. So, 
such additional issues could also fall under the broad “Eurasian” cooperation agenda: 
• Reciprocal recognition of degrees and professional certificates. 
• Facilitation of issuing visas and residence permits, visa liberalisation regime, including a set of 
agreements on readmission. 
• Special regime for the Kaliningrad Region (investment or trade-and-investment related). 
• Special regime for border regions. 
• Extended educational exchanges (Erasmus Mundus, and so forth). 
Regarding the timeframe, we take the long view. We believe that an agreement on deeper economic 
cooperation cum integration between the EU and the EAEU could, depending on the political 
conditions, become a reality by the mid-2020s. Within the next decade it will be a challenging task for 
the research community and policymakers to analyze the available options and procedures. IIASA aims 
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to explore and design plausible future modalities within the prospective research project in order to 
prepare a realistic assessment in advance. 
Trade policy regimes5 
The workshop on trade focused on discussing options for trade policy regimes, areas of economic 
convergence and disagreements among the countries in the region and also among other 
regions/countries, as well as on further global trade liberalization, and WTO compliance. 
Some of these issues were already referred to in the preceding paragraph. In addition, country-specific 
approaches towards integration with the EU and in wider Eurasia were discussed based on the 
position of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. After assessing the current trade conditions 
within northern Eurasia and the potential integration with the EU and other European and Asian 
partners, the workshop participants studied some other regional trade arrangements and associations, 
discussing the lessons learned. Furthermore, the discussion covered longer-term trade scenarios in 
selected sectors, like manufacturing, network services, energy, agriculture, and financial services. 
In particular, an overall and sectoral assessment of the economic impact of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement was extensively discussed. The workshop took place in the situation of escalating tensions 
between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. Impacts of these tensions on EU-EAEU trade negotiations were 
much discussed and some preliminary assessments of economic effects of the conflict both on Russia, 
Ukraine and the EU were presented, confronting the rather different EU and Russian views and data.6 
Specific issues, such as the compatibility of the EU and the EAEU trading systems (DCFTA, CIS FTA 
and Customs Union), including the position of the countries lying in between, such as Ukraine or 
Serbia, were also highlighted, as well as the potential impacts of the trade agreements on the parties. 
For example, the results presented by Alexander Knobel suggest that the cumulative effect of a 
hypothetical EU-EAEU FTA on Russia’s GDP would be 0.8% in the short run and up to 2.0 % in the 
long run.7 Short-term and long-term impacts on the GDP of Kazakhstan are lower, 0.6% and 1.2 %, 
respectively. In contrast, the impact on the economy of Belarus is marginal. Deep integration 
between the EAEU and the EU would be more beneficial for the former side only after sufficient 
integration inside the EAEU. According to Natalya Volchkova, the winners of the hypothetical 
EU-EAEU FTA would be Kazakhstan (2.6% GDP), the EU and Russia, and the losers will be Armenia 
(−3.4% GDP), and Belarus. But these results are very preliminary (see materials of 2nd IIASA 
Workshop). 
The general consensus is that the quantitative analysis of the potential economic impacts should go 
much further than an abridged CGE modeling and should be coupled with detailed qualitative 
assessments as well. A lot of new data, both qualitative and quantitative, are needed. Some of those 
may be obtained by extensive business surveys. 
Additional analysis of the workshop was devoted to ambitions of the EAEU to enter into preferential 
trade regimes with partners outside its immediate vicinity, such as with Israel, New Zealand and 
Vietnam, given that the EU already has a well-developed network of trade agreements with many 
                                                          
5 IIASA Workshop report on Trade Policy Regimes. 
6Havlik (2014). 
7Knobel, Chokaev (2014). 
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countries and regions worldwide. (Subsequently the talks with New Zealand, similarly to those of 
Russia with the EFTA countries, have been suspended due to the political crisis around Ukraine.). On 
the other hand, at the time of the seminar, in July 2014, the majority of the economic sanctions by 
Western countries, including the EU, and the Russian counter-sanctions were not yet in force, thus 
these subjects were not as yet part of the discussion. 
However, the EU participants expressed strong concerns over the direction of Russia’s—and linked to 
it, the EAEU’s—trade policies. They referred to the increasing use of non-tariff measures to restrict 
imports in general, and in particular from the EU, leading to several WTO dispute settlement cases 
already in such an early stage of Russia’s WTO membership. They expressed the view, that apart from 
a solution to the political tensions, a major change in these economic-trade policies would be also 
needed in order to create the conditions for starting serious thinking about the EU-EAEU cooperation, 
not to mention integration ideas.  
Finally, the impact of the economic crises on the process of regional integration was discussed too. 
Crises often stimulate a surge of protectionism in general. According to Alexander Libman, 
decision-makers meet stronger pressure due to the growing influence of interest groups, 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies and there is also a decline in public support for liberalization, even on 
regional basis. However, recent studies have suggested that regional integration might also advance 
during periods of crises.8 The reasons behind these contradictory conclusions are the following: 
• crises may challenge the limits of states’ capacities; 
• crises may trigger the need for preserving the existing economic ties, which are particularly 
important for close-by countries; 
• signing of economic integration agreements during periods of crises may serve as political signals 
to the domestic public. 
Of particular analytical importance is the idea of regional integration as an overarching anti-crisis 
strategy. Regional integration not only creates new business opportunities by lowering costs and 
allowing to achieve economies of scale, but it also strengthens the overall stability of an economic 
zone.9 In a variety of forms, regional integration has been already viewed as an independent anti-crisis 
component in various parts of the globe, in particular in the ASEAN area. 
The idea of stable power and trade blocs was built during the Cold War period. In the 21st century the 
developments of the global system drive the trade integration towards more complicated models. 
Trade blocks have the following common features: 
• reflect the increasing complexity of the global trade system; 
• speed of communication that accelerates the pace of change; 
• stratification of the production processes and value chains, driving fast changes in the national 
GDP; 
• volatility of global power politics generating a need for more flexible portfolio of trade agreements; 
• recent developments have shown that the internal power structures within countries may change 
rapidly, and the new decision-makers might have different priorities. 
                                                          
8Vinokurov, Libman (2014). 
9Glazyev, Chushkin, Tkachuk (2013). 
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Non-tariff barriers10 
This workshop focused on major issues related to the compatibility and costs of technical 
regulations and standards for industrial products and SPS regulations for agriculture products 
applied (or to be applied) in the EU, EAEU and neighboring countries. This included also issues of 
harmonization of various national and regional standards with each other, as well as with 
international standards, furthermore accreditation and conformity assessments. 
The meeting was held at a time when the additional economic sanctions were already entering into 
effect between the EU and Russia, and significant, although diverse estimates of likely effects on both 
sides from both European and Russian sources were presented. During the discussion the EU experts 
again expressed the view that technical regulations and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were increasingly 
used by Russia, in addition to the formal sanctions, as tools against imports. 
NTBs are conveniently analyzed by dividing them in two groups. The first group (NTB-T) includes measures 
that might be needed for objective, protective reasons and could hypothetically be harmonized to a certain 
extent. This group includes sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations affecting trade, 
non-automatic licensing, quotas, bans and quantitative control measures other than sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and technical barriers. The second group (NTB-P) includes all other barriers: price 
control measures; tariff rate quotas, financial measures that affect competition such as designating special 
importers, restricting marketing and public procurement, subsidies, etc. These are costs which can be 
described as “sand in the wheels.” Theoretically, these costs should be eliminated completely. However, 
in practice this is far more difficult than reducing the first group of barriers. 
The economic impacts of reducing NTBs can be very substantial, in fact far exceeding the impacts of 
eliminating the remaining import tariffs. For example, a 5% decrease in NTB-T within the EAEU only 
(that is, not counting the potential effects of the EU-EAEU economic integration) would give Belarus 
an overall 2.7% increase in welfare and a 0.9% increase in GDP in the medium term, while an identical 
5% decrease in NTB-P (“sand in the wheels”) would lead to an increase in welfare in Belarus by 4.2% 
and GDP — by 1.6%.11 
In the EU context, the elimination of NTBs has been at the heart of the integration agenda since the 
1980s. The 1985 “White Book” prescribed 279 concrete measures aiming at the establishment of the 
1992 Common Market.12 At that time the focus has been more on goods. The decades-long efforts 
have resulted in a substantive reduction, if not the elimination, of non-tariff barriers of internal trade 
in physical products. In the last decades, however, with the increasing importance of trade in services, 
this sector has also moved into the focus of attention but the results in removing even purely 
protective regulations are still limited. 
In the EU-EAEU context, a specific issue discussed at the workshop concerned the development 
of the standards system of the EAEU, with questions raised about how far this will make use of 
international (ISO) standards, and over the compatibility with EU standards. The discussion 
reflected the fact that by this time the negotiations on the EU-Russia “New Agreement” 
                                                          
10 IIASA Workshop report on Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Regulations.11See Vinokurov et al. (2015) for the 
EAEU; see Francois et al. (2013) for the comparative EU estimates. 
11See Vinokurov et al. (2015) for the EAEU; see Francois et al. (2013) for the comparative EU estimates. 
12Glazyev, Chushkin, Tkachuk (2013). 
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(the intended successor of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) which had in its 
focus exactly this kind of regulatory approximation, had been already suspected due to the 
political crisis. While these questions could not yield to simple and immediate answers, the 
meeting established an analytical framework and network of personal contacts through which key 
officials and independent analysts may more closely work in the future. 
A related issue of high importance is how far the relevant provisions of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova will impact on 
trade between these states and the members of the EAEU. It has been noted that there were two 
trilateral processes between Ukraine, Russia and the European Commission, including one on trade 
policy effects arising for Russia from the implementation of EU-Ukrainian DCFTA. As mentioned above, 
these talks, however, ended unsuccessfully in December, 2015 leading to the suspension by Russia of 
its CIS FTA relations with Ukraine. The issue of what technical standards for industrial and agri-food 
products should prevail as between the EU and EAEU can be discussed under two headings: 
• first, with the change of the political situation, what an agreed process between the EU and the 
EAEU/Russia might consist of; and 
• second, what might be the rules for those European countries which are neither in the EU nor in 
the EAEU, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which have inherited GOST standards from the 
Soviet Union and now have to implement DCFTAs with the EU). 
Concerning the first subject, there seems to be little realistic prospect for simplistic solutions between 
the EU and EAEU, such as e.g. that the latter would simply adopt all EU standards. Instead there should 
be a more selective, steady process, taking undoubtedly many years, for a careful selection of products 
for which there could be different solutions. The problem has to be broken down into manageable 
packages. A first package would consist of international standards set by the ISO and the UNECE, of 
which all EU and EAEU member states are members, and here it should be examined how far both 
parties fully recognise ISO and other international standards (including those set by the UNECE 
especially for motor vehicles). A second package would relate to the product standards which the EU 
has placed under its so-called “new approach” policy. The key point here is that the “new approach” 
is a two-stage process, first with directives setting out the “essential requirements” for safety, and 
then followed by technically detailed implementing standards. The implementing standards are 
themselves voluntary, and any supplier can propose its own preferred standard as long as it is in 
conformity with the “essential requirements.” 
It is quite possible that many Russian GOST standards do meet these requirements, in which case this 
should be established and made known. Conversely, it should be examined how far products carrying the 
mark of compliance with the EU technical regulations ( ) are acceptable for import into the Russian and 
EAEU markets. Given the extent of the market presence in Russia (pre-sanctions) of EU suppliers of a huge 
number of industrial and agri-food products, there are evidently practical solutions, and these need to be 
analysed so that the remaining policy issues could be dealt with in a pragmatic manner. A third stage 
would then see the identification of a limited number of important products where there could be 
targeted negotiation of solutions with a possibility for mutual recognition.13 
                                                          
13Exploratory analysis was done already more than a decade ago – see RECEP (2002). 
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As regards the second issue of the three DCFTA states, they now gradually adopt the EU legislation 
and standards, and repeal conflicting mandatory GOST standards. However, their manufacturers 
remain free to produce according to GOST standards for supplying EAEU markets, since it is a general 
practice that exporting countries produce in line with the standards and technical requirements of the 
importing countries. The additional idea of the Russian experts that there should be also agreements 
that imports from EAEU states that conform to GOST standards would still be recognised at the 
markets of the DCFTA countries, raises more questions. This might be an acceptable solution for a 
limited transition period, but under the DCFTAs the 3 partner countries have undertaken a legal 
obligation to eventually apply only EU regulations and standards in the sectors covered. Should they 
fail to do so, their own exports to the EU markets would suffer, as the administrative facilitation which 
is a major element of the benefits of the DCFTAs, could not be applied. Thus, should at some point the 
trilateral discussions between the EU, Ukraine and Russia/EAEU resume, this issue will need to be 
thoroughly discussed in order to see the possibilities for solution. 
 
 
 
The Future of Energy in Eurasia14 
The Eurasian continent which will account for over half of 
world energy demand in the near future will significantly 
shape the global energy landscape. What will this future hold: 
a growing energy cooperation and integration or increasing 
competition over resources and pipelines?  
Will the continent lead a green energy revolution or gridlock 
the globe in an energy system dependent on dirty fossil fuels? 
How will natural gas, which is at the center of European 
energy debates, serve as a bridge to the future? What is the impact of the European Energy Union on the 
Eurasian developments? These were some of the questions discussed at the workshop. 
This workshop also brought new insights into the risks and uncertainties around the energy trade 
and security in the Eurasian region. Specifically, it focused on discussing the short-term risks and 
opportunities, in particular those related to the conflict in Ukraine, as well as long-term 
uncertainties and possible solutions covering perspectives of energy futures for regional players. 
It also considered how the political economy of energy in the region shapes national plans, 
strategies and scenarios. 
In particular, there is a clear intention to form a common energy market in the Energy Union but there 
are also major challenges given the diverging interests of individual EU member states and the 
complex interlinkages among individual energy carriers. Energy savings, regulatory issues, structural 
effects and political decisions all affect energy policies, the energy supply mix and the energy 
                                                          
14 IIASA Workshop report on Futures of Energy in Eurasia in a Global Context. 15The European Commission’s 
“Strategy to a resilient Energy Union”, aimed at diversifying the supply of gas to the EU in terms of sources, 
suppliers and routes. 
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consumption. Despite frequently diverging interests it is expected that the EU will increasingly speak 
with one voice also with respect to energy.15This will have a major impact on the EAEU where energy 
carriers represent a major share of the economy and of export revenues. Furthermore, the energy 
demand is likely to decrease, especially for fossil fuels, not least due to efficiency improvements, the 
increasing share of green energy and climate change targets. Finally, there will be also some 
reorientation of EU energy imports due to the conflict in Ukraine. 
At the same time, the harmonization and liberalization of the energy market is being planned in the 
EAEU as well: according to the decrees passed by the Eurasian Economic Commission, a common 
electricity market will be established within the EAEU by 2019, and a common oil and gas market by 
2025. This will result in the liberalization of energy supplies within the EAEU. A perfect substitutability 
of energy goods between the EAEU member states is expected to take place after 2025. It should be 
also pointed out that Russia expressed its readiness to supply gas following the rules of the EU’s Third 
Energy Package. This might be an important factor if an agreed solution to the ongoing EU competition 
case concerning Gazprom is to be found.  
The planned EAEU energy market reforms (by 2019 and 2025, respectively) draw on the 
experience of the EU regulations and are in line with the relevant WTO rules.  This increases the 
compatibility between the European and the Eurasian Economic energy unions. The EU-Eurasian 
energy cooperation could be enhanced on the basis of the Energy Charter Treaty (1998) 
mechanism. The Energy Charter mechanism could provide an effective tool for the promotion of 
political dialogue and cooperation on regulatory issues, as well as to promote further 
regional/cross-border electricity projects, such as between Armenia and Iran. However, this could 
have no relevance for Russia which originally signed the ECT, but in 2009 suspended its provisional 
application, thus at present considers itself not to be bound by this Treaty. Long-term investment 
in infrastructure projects (e.g. pipelines and joint Arctic energy resources exploration) between 
the EU and the EAEU would in any case mean more stability for both supply and demand than 
dependence on spot prices and demand fluctuations for gas and oil in Asia. China as an increasingly 
important market for EAEU energy exports will play a major role in EU-EAEU energy policies.16 Both 
Russia and Kazakhstan intend to develop increasingly close bilateral cooperation in this area in the 
form of long-term supply agreements, even if there are still open issues especially with respect to 
prices. 
To sum up, the future of energy in the Eurasian context is all about energy security. For the EU, this 
is supply security (source security, transit security, as well as fair and predictable pricing). For Russia, 
this is demand security (financial and economic security, as well as fair and predictable pricing. For all, 
it is about environmental security and systemic resilience. 
Development of the Transport, Electric power and 
Telecommunications Infrastructures17 
                                                          
15The European Commission’s “Strategy to a resilient Energy Union”, aimed at diversifying the supply of gas to 
the EU in terms of sources, suppliers and routes. 
16Paik (2015). 
17 IIASA Workshop report on Development of transport and infrastructure in Eurasia. 
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This workshop focused on the major aspects related to transport and infrastructure developments in 
Eurasia, in particular on the prospects for international cooperation in the construction, 
modernization and further development of major Eurasian transport corridors until 2030, the 
development of the trans-border transport infrastructure in the EU-EAEU context, the challenges of 
financing large scale infrastructure projects in the strained geopolitical and economic conditions, 
opportunities for cooperation, feasibility analysis and searching for win–win solutions in the context 
of development of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
The joint implementation of large transport infrastructure projects could become one of the main 
directions in EU-EAEU cooperation agenda. Here are but a few of those: Silk Road Economic Belt; 
Trans-Eurasian Belt “Razvitie” in Eurasia (a geo-economic belt of cooperation on the entire domain 
between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans); CAREC corridors; Trans-European networks projects of large 
infrastructure networks of transport, energy and telecommunications, etc. Economic cooperation in 
Eurasia requires an efficient land transport network. The integration possibilities of the EAEU in transport 
and infrastructure determine not only the agenda for cooperation, but also the long-term prospects of the 
EAEU’s development. To achieve development effects, transport corridors are to become also economic 
corridors. According to some opinions the maximum economic benefit is gained by concentrating 
economic activity and investment in the regions adjacent to main transport lines. But economic growth in 
the development corridors should be self-sustaining. This can be a perspective in the EU-EAEU 
“technology-and-knowledge” exchange. 
The discussion on Pan-Eurasian infrastructure is being often confined exclusively to transportation 
issues—railways and roads. Here, the discussions focused on two issues. First, the inadequacy of the 
existing infrastructure, in particular of border crossing points in relation to the projected needs and 
opportunities for trade. Second, technical issues that define the speed, volume, and costs of logistics, 
such as the state of border crossings, the railway gauge problem, and development of marine ports 
and airports were tackled as well. 
Albeit naturally being a starting point for a substantive discussion, the transport infrastructure should 
be followed (at least) by the electric power grid and telecommunication infrastructures. This 
“infrastructure troika” (transport, electricity grid and telecoms) is very relevant to both the 
trans-Eurasian and the EU-EAEU contexts. 
The development of common electric power markets (CPMs) would allow for greater trade in electric 
power—a commodity with huge trade potential on its own. It would also engender significant 
synergies both in price and stability of power supplies. However, due to the energy security concerns, 
the implementation of these potentially promising possibilities needs the re-establishment of trust 
undermined by the Ukrainian crisis. Also due to this reason it cannot be expected that a unified and 
homogenous CPM stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok (and Shanghai) will become a reality any time 
soon. Neither do we think that it should be viewed as a top priority. However, opportunities may arise 
to create a number of regional and sub-regional common electricity markets based on the 
development of infrastructure to generate and transmit electricity. Any Eurasian CPM would develop 
gradually within the parameters established in bilateral and multilateral agreements. The EU, China, 
India, and Iran are all potential key partners for the countries of Northern and Central Eurasia in the 
creation of Eurasian CPMs. 
24 
The development of trans-continental fiber-optic links is another huge opportunity. Currently, the land-
based capacities are limited, and most of data from Europe to Asia is transferred by undersea fiber-optic 
channels. These, however, have at least two drawbacks, namely the length and the time needed for any 
repairs. Only 6% of Europe–Asia traffic flows through the land-based fiber-optic links. This share can be 
substantially enlarged. Adequate regulatory frameworks, security, and investments are the key aspects. 
 
Mobility of People: Visa Regimes, Mobility of Pensions, Labour Migration, 
Educational Exchanges, and Recognition of Diplomas and Certificates 
Mobility of People: Visa Regimes, Mobility of Pensions, Labour 
Migration, Educational Exchanges, and Recognition of Diplomas 
and Certificates18. The workshop covered several specific issues 
that are linked to the movement of people. The discussion and 
policy recommendations are summarised in detail in the recent 
IIASA Working Paper.19 Namely, the work focused on the economic 
aspects of the mobility of persons, as well as readmission agreements, the facilitation of entry 
formalities and visa-free regimes, labour migration, mobility of pensions, large-scale educational 
exchanges, the recognition of professional diplomas and certificates. Some of the particular aspects 
looked at during the discussion are set out below: 
• Migration: a visa-free regime between the EU and the EAEU, including a set of agreements on 
readmission. Once all the Russia-EU disputes are settled (just to reiterate, the EU-EAEU cooperation 
proposals are long-term ones), passenger and migration flows between the EAEU member-states and 
the EU will increase. For any serious negotiations about an EU-EAEU visa-free regime to succeed, a 
complete set of readmission agreements among all countries involved should be concluded and 
implemented. The EAEU and the EU can benefit from introducing a visa-free regime that would have 
the usual limits (for example, 90 days in a year), which will facilitate tourism, student and business 
exchanges among member states at low cost. However, this will be most probably a gradual process 
and there might be some modifications and restrictions to the idea of an EU-EAEU visa-free regime to 
make it politically feasible. These should be accepted to make the deal possible. 
• Labor migration should be left out of the EU-EAEU agenda, at least for the medium term. It is a 
common knowledge that the EU has a well-developed common labour market which comprises 28 
states (plus the EFTA countries) with a total population of over 510 million (to what extent this situation 
will change after the UK’s Brexit referendum is unknown as yet.) By contrast, it is still almost unknown 
that the Eurasian Economic Union also represents a common labour market, effectively uniting five 
countries with ca. 180 million people. In the EAEU, a citizen of any member state is eligible to work in 
another member state without being subject to licensing and quota regimes. The labour migrants and 
their family members enjoy medical protections and access to educational facilities. At the moment, the 
two common labour markets functions side by side—a well-developed and mature European one and a 
                                                          
18 IIASA Workshop report on Labor Market and Migration across the Eurasian Continent. 
19Vinokurov, Pereboyev (2016). 
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nascent Eurasian one. In our opinion, due to the extreme sensitivity of labour migration, this issue should 
be left out of the EU-EAEU agenda for several years. 
• An EU-EAEU agreement on the mobility of pensions based on the principle of proportionality. EAEU 
is moving towards a system of pension portability based on the principle of proportionality. The EU has 
recently implemented a system of full international portability of pension rights. Due to the large 
potential flows of migrants, in particular from the EAEU countries to the EU, this theme is relevant for 
both the EU and the EAEU and can become an issue in mutual cooperation. While numerous 
technicalities will have to be ironed out, the parties should base their efforts on the principle of 
proportional pension accrual seeking a fair and stable international system of social security. 
• Recognition of professional certificates and diplomas: progress on reciprocal recognition of 
professional certificates and degrees between the EU and the EAEU. EU and the EAEU member states 
have different practices for recognition of academic and professional qualifications. Progress in 
mutual recognition would be helpful to improve the mobility of labour. The main question is: To what 
extent is the mutual recognition of professional certificates and diplomas possible? While the priority 
vector should be for the expansion of mutual recognition, it is evident that a large number of 
exemptions will remain. The European Commission and the Eurasian Economic Commission could 
start a dialogue on mutual recognition instruments between the EU and EAEU. 
• Economic aspects of the mobility of people. From the EU’s point of view enhanced possibilities for 
the movement of people for economic purposes (linked to the delivery of goods and services, or to 
investments) is always linked to broader economic liberalisation agreements. Practically all its 
integration-type agreements, starting from the traditional goods-only FTAs, to the DCFTAs and the 
“new generation” broad FTAs, contain provisions about the movement of people. This is based both 
on the objective need of ensuring at least the minimum conditions for business, especially when it 
comes to the trans-border supply of services and investment activities, as well as the EU’s particular 
economic interests. As the supply possibilities of labour in general, but especially in the regions around 
the EU, far exceed the EU’s needs, the EU links such possibilities for its partners to broader integration 
structures, covering all four freedoms (movement of goods, services, capital and labour). There is no 
realistic perspective to enhance the movement of people for economic purposes in an EU-EAEU 
context if this is not linked to some form of a comprehensive integration agreement. 
• Large-scale educational exchanges: substantial enlargement of academic mobility. As concerns 
EU-EAEU exchanges of students and teachers, the current Erasmus Mundus and Marie Curie stipend 
exchanges should be substantially expanded. Truly large-scale educational exchanges can be 
attractive for both sides, resulting in hundreds of thousands of students and faculty crossing the 
borders yearly, thus enhancing the mutual understanding and people-to-people contacts. 
One of the main problems to be solved within the EAEU is linked to the negative demographic 
forecasts. For example, Russia will need a sizeable inward migration of about 5 million people in the 
coming decade; the labour force is projected to decline by nearly 10 million persons until 2035.20The 
majority of the expected migrants will come from the former Soviet republics and probably will not 
close the gap in high skilled workers’ shortages. According to MiRPAL, the fourth quarter (4 Oct. 
2015—12 Jan. 2016) closed with 9.88 million foreigners staying in the Russian Federation. That 
                                                          
20According to Alexander Shirov’s estimates from materials of the 6th IIASA Workshop. 
26 
represents a −6.6 percent quarterly decrease and a −10.9 percent year-on-year drop: 1.05 million 
foreigners less than by the end of 2014.21 
Language barriers and cultural factors are the main bottlenecks for the internal labour mobility in 
Europe.22 Current migration and labour market problems lead to attempts to restrict the existing EU 
regulations regarding migration—this factor played a major role also in the recent UK Brexit 
referendum. On the other hand, the EU moves forward with visa liberalization with some other 
countries (Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) as part of broader integration agreements.23 
The discussion in the workshop ended with the conclusion that the EAEU did not face as much 
migration pressures as the EU, where especially migration from the Middle East and Africa represents 
a serious challenge. There are no easy solutions to the migration and integration problems. The EU 
and the EAEU could potentially unite their efforts to counter the associated negative trends, affecting 
both sides, because most of Eurasia will face similar labour market challenges in terms of skill 
shortages and migration. Another problem discussed was a drop of remittances within the EAEU. The 
prospects for improving the situation of labour migrants are not encouraging. The current Russian 
economic slowdown and rouble depreciation continued to affect the flows of personal remittances. It 
should be mentioned here that an additional actual problem which could be solved within EU-EAEU 
cooperation, namely the development and implementation of financial instruments to “transform” 
remittances into investment is relevant as well. 
EU-EAEU in Greater Eurasia: 
Long-term Agenda for Economic Cooperation 
It is assumed that the political relations between the 
EU and Russia will have got back to a more 
constructive track, with an end of the mutual 
sanctions, and also an easing of relations between 
Ukraine and Russia. This is the hypothetical context in 
which it becomes relevant to explore the medium- 
and long-term possibilities for constructive initiatives 
between the parties. 
The first issue concerns the possible establishment 
of official relations between the EU and EAEU. It is fair to say that for the time being the IIASA Eurasian 
Integration Challenges project is the main and possibly the only unofficial forum under which there 
have been contacts among experts from both the European Commission and the Eurasian Economic 
Commission. 
Assuming that the necessary political conditions will have been created, a first step would probably 
be the launching of an official dialogue process between the two Commissions to review the possible 
agenda of topics of mutual interest. It could be based on the actual or planned activities of the EAEU, 
                                                          
21Gutiérrez Chávez, Prokhorova (2016). 
22Timo Baas, materials of 6th IIASA Workshop. 
23Peter Balas, materials of the 6th IIASA Workshop. 
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comparing those with the EU’s many agreements with third countries: trade policy, trade-related 
regulatory policies, infrastructure for transport corridors, etc. These agendas are well established and 
structured. The open question is always to work out which agenda items can be taken beyond the 
stage of dialogue, onto the higher level of operational and legally binding commitments. Assuming 
that the necessary conditions are ensured, the current review of EU Neighborhood Policy could be an 
opportunity to initiate the EU-EAEU dialogue. 
A next step would then be to identify the core items that could give the prospective cooperation 
project a critical mass. An inevitable candidate would be the preparation of negotiations of a free 
trade area between the EU and the EAEU. This would raise a number of legal and economic 
challenges, as well as political considerations (resulting from diverging economic size and 
development levels, among others—see Appendix Figure 2). From the aspect of international law 
the main issue is the requirement of the WTO that member states should only make free trade 
agreements with other WTO member states in order to ensure compliance with the obligations 
of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. On this point Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO in 
December 2015 is an important factor, given that Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are already 
WTO members. This only leaves Belarus, which seems to be still far behind. However, recently 
Belarus has expressed some interest in a more open and modern trade policy framework with the 
third countries. The EU would surely welcome such a development. It also corresponds to the 
interests of the large EAEU members (Russia and Kazakhstan) which strive for a network of FTAs 
with third parties. 
As to the fundamental interests in a FTA between the EU and EAEU, this has been the subject of 
considerable analysis and debate, with some clear conclusions already achieved. For the EU a FTA 
with the EAEU would be from an economic aspect an attractive proposition, since it would give 
preferential access to an important export market. However, this would require major progress 
towards solving the Ukrainian crisis. On the side of the EAEU the picture is more complicated. The 
Russian experts in particular often refer to the asymmetry of this proposition, considered as 
favorable to the EU, since Russia’s exports to the EU - mainly commodities - are already tariff-free 
or nearly so. There is the counter-argument that external liberalization would be an essential part 
of the comprehensive economic restructuring and modernization strategies that are badly needed 
for both Russia and Kazakhstan in order to regain competitiveness and a growth dynamic. While 
there is no clear outcome to this important debate, it still invites reflection on what other 
components of a prospective FTA would bring important benefits to Russia (here the energy 
domain may be a case in point, see below). 
As regards the energy sector, the present developments clearly go in the direction of mutual 
diversification of supplies and markets on the side of both the EU and Russia, away from each 
other. This is a move away from the simple logic of economic geography, but seems to be an 
irreversible development, based on geopolitical and security considerations. The EU is surrounded 
by sources of alternative gas supplies, while Russia aims to exploit the huge potential of the 
Chinese market. However, there are very different degrees to which this diversification may occur. 
Moreover, on the whole it may be judged that some reduction of the monopoly-supplier and 
monopoly- buyer relationship between the EU and Russia would be a healthier political 
proposition in the long run. This does not exclude, on the other hand, that the EU and Russia will 
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come to better terms with each other over the conditions for gas supplies. As it was mentioned, 
the European Commission is currently engaged in a major anti-trust case raised by some EU 
member states against Gazprom. There is also some opposition to the expansion of the Nord 
Stream project, and uncertainty regarding the South/Turkish Stream project. Such cases can in 
principle yield to negotiated solutions. While it is beyond the scope of the work done so far to 
analyze how these issues may be resolved, the relevant point is that for the future some kind of 
more cooperative modus vivendi would be definitely desirable. Maybe the resolution of the 
competition policy case and the geopolitical considerations could be resolved by exploring 
alternative solutions for a new settlement in the energy security domain. 
If the idea of a FTA were to be pursued there are some inevitable actions which should accompany 
the removal of tariffs, first of all regarding the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the field of technical 
standards for industrial products, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards for the agri-food 
sector. There are also other important subjects, like competition policy, public procurement, the 
regulations related to state-owned companies, intellectual property rights and the liberalization 
of service sectors. It has been already mentioned that the positive economic impact of decreasing 
NTBs can be very substantial, in fact exceeding by far the impacts of lowering remaining import tariffs. 
These are all complex fields which are nowadays at the heart of all global and inter-regional trade 
agreements. While negotiations in these fields are often extremely complex, as the current EU-US TTIP 
negotiations confirm,24 they are nonetheless amenable to compromise solutions. 
Here it is worth taking note of the new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between the EU and Kazakhstan signed at the Summit in Astana on 21 December 2015. The 
relevant point is that the structure of this agreement has the same classic agenda (for the EU) of 
economic and political issues that invariably appear in its external association and cooperation 
agreements. This new agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan is of course nowhere near as 
deep as the DCFTAs between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and could not include 
free trade aspects, given that Kazakhstan is a member of the EAEU. However, it seeks to advance 
cooperation on a wide agenda, and illustrates the issues that arise for bilateral relations between 
the EU and any member state of the EAEU. In particular, both the EU and Russia have tried over 
the years to negotiate a new agreement to replace their 1994-vintage Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, and under the hypothesis of renewed constructive relations between 
the two parties these negotiations would be probably resumed. In this case the issue of coherence 
between the two agreements, with Russia bilaterally, as well as with the EAEU multilaterally, 
would arise. It is here that the EU-Kazakhstan agreement is a relevant first test case. 
A next topic of the highest importance concerns the future of trade and economic relations 
between the EU, the EAEU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which have concluded Association 
Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs) with the EU. 
Looking forward to more constructive developments as mentioned above, there have been two 
trilateral processes between Ukraine, Russia and the European Commission, including one on 
matters of trade policy, proposed by Russia to deal with the presumed negative impacts of the 
implementation of EU-Ukrainian DCFTA, which, however, ended unsuccessfully in December 2015. 
                                                          
24Hamilton and Pelkmans (2015). 
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The second process on gas supplies and transit from Russia via Ukraine to the EU is still ongoing. 
It is to be hoped that at some stage the circumstances will permit the opening of constructive 
negotiations on trade policy between the three DCFTA signatory states and the EAEU, no doubt 
with the participation also of the European Commission to watch over issues of compatibility 
between the DCFTAs and the three countries’ possible FTAs with the EAEU. A potential broader 
free trade agreement between the EU and the EAEU could be one of the possible options.25 
Finally, there are other important issues recently emerging under what could be called a possible 
“Greater Eurasia” agenda which concern not only the EU and the EAEU, but also the future 
relations of both with the major players in Asia, in particular with China, as direct neighbor of the 
EAEU.26 The possible development of the relationship among the 3 large economies of the EU, the 
EAEU and China, raises more questions than answers, not least since China’s inclusion 
fundamentally alters the economic dimensions in Eurasia (Appendix Figure 3). There are some 
major developments: China’s “One Belt One Road” as a framework idea and the new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the development of railway and road connectivity, and the 
Russian-Chinese projects for energy supplies, as examples of the possible content. One of the 
most tangible topics is indeed that of the transport corridors between Europe and Asia, with both 
Russia and Kazakhstan occupying prominent places on the Eurasian map: from both EU and East 
Asian perspectives there is interest in diversified transport corridors. 
This leads further to the question “what about the rest of Asia?” which other could be included in 
future Greater Eurasia initiatives? The first discussions at IIASA suggested that while the focus should 
be on the EU-EAEU and China, the discourse should also embrace relations with, and the possible links 
to, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Also, concerning South East Asia and India similar questions arise 
as there are relevant organizations that seek to provide some answers, such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). For countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region the major means of meeting their energy needs will be increasing energy imports. Russia and 
the Eurasian Economic Union are in the best position to supply oil and gas. The major energy resources 
can come from Eastern Siberia and Far East. Potentially, they are able to meet the needs of the 
Republic of Korea and Japan in coal, oil and gas. By the development of railways and maritime routes 
(the Northern Sea Route, etc.) the transport sectors will support these processes. The EAEU, especially 
the Russian Far East, would greatly benefit from the transfer of technology from the Republic of Korea 
and Japan. The trade and investment cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries belong to strategic 
priorities for Russia and the EAEU. Overall the range of possible topics and their respective plausible 
geographic contours merit deeper exploration. As a point of departure we state that the involved 
states share common interests as regards trade flows, investment flows, and the development of 
trans-border transport and energy infrastructure. 
In this context the discussion platform established at IIASA and some preliminary findings we have 
summed up in this Report play an important role. They also call for a more fundamental long-term 
research project. The details of such a new and expanded Eurasian Project will be spelt out in a 
separate document which is under preparation, covering the potential Phase II. The research is 
                                                          
25Some of the available options are discussed in Adarov et al. (2015). 
26Emerson (2013). 
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expected to focus on two dimensions. The first one is the underlying theory which will address 
the following research questions: What is the future of regional integration? What are the 
consequences of rising regionalism? What are the ways to raise efficiency of regional 
organizations and narrow implementation gaps? What is the impact of integration and 
disintegration on economic development, industrial and scientific cooperation and welfare? The 
goal of this component is to carry out systematic theoretical assessment of different options of 
economic integration, disintegration, and various modes of economic cooperation, primarily at 
the regional level. The second component is a policy-oriented one. It would aim at a set of possible 
options for closer cooperation between the EU and the EAEU, expanded to the analysis of the 
relations both with China and supplement the research findings with draft sectoral road maps and 
policy recommendations.  
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Appendix: GDP and Population Data on Greater Eurasia 
FIGURE 1. Real GDPs in the “enlarged” EU and EAEU, in % of total, at PPP, year 2015. 
 
 
Note: “Enlarged” EU includes the five EU candidates. 
Source: Eurostat, Eurasian Economic Commission and own estimates.  
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FIGURE 2. Real GDP in Eurasia (“Lisbon to Vladivostok”), in % of total, at PPP, year 2015. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Eurasian Economic Commission and own estimates. 
FIGURE 3. Real GDP in Wider Eurasia (“Lisbon – Shanghai”), in % of total, at PPP, year 2015. 
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Table 1. GDP (nominal) and population of EU-28, EAEU, and their common neighborhoods. 
 2015 GDP, current prices, $ bln 
2015 GDP at PPP, 
$ bln 
2015 population, 
mln 
EU-28 
Austria 374.1 404.3 8.6 
Belgium 454.7 494.1 11.3 
Bulgaria 49.0 136.9 7.2 
Croatia 48.9 91.1 4.2 
Cyprus 19.3 28.1 0.9 
Czech Republic 181.9 332.5 10.5 
Denmark 295.0 258.7 5.7 
Estonia 22.7 37.5 1.3 
Finland 229.7 225.0 5.5 
France 2421.6 2646.9 64.3 
Germany 3357.6 3840.6 81.9 
Greece 195.3 286.0 10.8 
Hungary 120.6 258.4 9.9 
Ireland 238.0 257.4 4.6 
Italy 1815.8 2170.9 60.8 
Latvia 27.0 49.1 2.0 
Lithuania 41.3 82.4 2.9 
Luxembourg 57.4 55.7 0.6 
Malta 9.8 15.4 0.4 
Netherlands 738.4 832.6 16.9 
Poland 474.9 1005.4 38.0 
Portugal 199.1 289.8 10.4 
Romania 177.3 413.8 19.9 
Slovak Republic 86.6 161.0 5.4 
Slovenia 42.8 64.0 2.1 
Spain 1199.7 1615.1 46.4 
Sweden 492.6 473.4 9.9 
United Kingdom 2849.3 2679.3 65.1 
TOTAL 16220.4 19205.4 507.4 
EAEU-5 
Belarus 54.6 167.7 9.5 
Russia 1324.7 3717.6 146.3 
Kazakhstan 173.2 429.1 17.7 
Armenia 10.6 25.3 3.0 
Kyrgyzstan  6.7 20.1 6.0 
Tajikistan 7.8 23.3 8.5 
TOTAL 1577.6 4383.2 190.9 
EU-EAEU Common Neighborhood 
Georgia 14.0 35.6 3.7 
Azerbaijan  54.0 169.4 9.4 
Moldova 6.4 17.8 3.6 
Ukraine 90.5 339.5 45.2 
TOTAL 165.0 562.3 61.8 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, authors’ calculations. 
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